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THE OPERATIONS OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 39TH INFANTRY  
(9TH INFANTRY DIVISION) AT CHERENCE LE ROUSSEL  
FRANCE, 4-10 AUGUST 1944, DURING THE  
GERMAN ATTACK ON AVARANCHE  
(NORTHERN FRANCE CAMPAIGN)  
(Personal Experience of a Battalion Operations Officer)

Types of operation described: BATTALION IN THE ATTACK  
BATTALION IN THE DEFENSE

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INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of the 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division, during the engagement of Cherence le Roussel, France, 4-10 August 1944; just after the start of the Northern France Campaign.

The action described herein was part of the largest counterattack since D-Day. At least four German armored divisions as well as infantry were employed on the small sector, Mortain-Sourdeval (1), against the VII Corps on a fourteen mile front. (2) The bulk of this attack fell upon the 9th and 30th Infantry Divisions. (3) (see map A )

In order (to better understand the situation and actions which occurred, let me take you back a week and look at the situation from a large point of view. On 25 July 1944, following the breakthrough west of St. Lo, the First and Third Armies started the Northern France Campaign. The Third Army shot like a rocket down the west coast to overrun the Brittany Peninsula. (4) The First Army kept constant pressure upon the dazed, retreating enemy and drove southeast past Mortain. (5)

A large gap appeared between the center and the right flank of the First Army. (6) Enemy strength became noticed opposite this gap in the Vire-Sourdeval-Mortain-Barenton area. (7) The Germans were apparently planning for a large scale counterattack to restore their front by smashing through this ever-widening gap on a narrow front. (8) They were massing not only infantry but armor as well. Where they would strike was only too plain. It was almost certain to be a drive

(1) A-3; (2) A-2, p. 49; (3) A-4; (4) A-1, p. 4; (5) A-1, p. 4; (6) A-1, p. 4; (7) A-1, p. 4; (8) A-4.

toward Avaranche. This was the narrowest ~~part~~ of the corridor (9), and was opposite the growing gap. If successful the Germans would cut off the Third Army from their supply base. (10) This would then facilitate the wiping out of the forces in Brittany. (11) If on the other hand the Germans failed they would have lost vitally needed forces for future action.

It therefore became necessary to block this gap and still continue to exploit the breakthrough. (12) However, before going further, it is best to look at what the German Commander himself had in mind. From an excerpt, Estimate of the Situation, of Field Marshal Von Kluge (13), the plans and missions of the German Forces at this time, 4 August 1944, were apparent.

"Army intends to attack from the Area St. Michel de Montjoie-Sourdeval-Barenton-Domfront in a general direction toward Avaranche along a line S bank of Alliere-hills N and NW Vire-St. Martin-Champs Du Boult-St. Pois, employing his withdrawn and reorganized tank formations, while defending his right flank.

"The first mission is to cut off the enemy units which penetrated to the south from their rear communications and to reestablish our communications with the coast."

This decision to counterattack fitted in nicely with the allied plans to encircle these forces. (14) The delay that this counterattack involved lost the precious days for Von Kluge (15) to save his forces from the encirclement and great defeat of the German forces in the Falaise Gap (16). Field Marshal Von Kluge seemed well aware of this large sweeping move to cut him off from his left and left rear. (17) He was also aware that the German forces in Brittany

(9) A-4; (10) A-7, p. 181; (11) A-8, p. 182; (12) A-1, p. 4; (13) A-1, p. 5; (14) A-4; (15) A-1, p. 5; (16) A-4; (17) A-1, p. 5

isolated by the Third Army's drive southward were being annihilated. (18) Hence any delay would invite disaster. (19) However, since Hitler had ordered an attack (20), he made every effort to gather his forces to stage this great attack by 7 August. (21)

The Allies had a few plans of their own. They would block the thrust and still keep up the relentless drive to the Southeast. (22) On the right of the First Army the VII Corps was to continue its drive, threatening the enemy's left and rear. (23) The 30th Division was shifted to the VII Corps (24). The XIX and V Corps were to keep up their drives to the South. (25) These were the plans for the 4 and 5 August. The result was a large pinwheel effect. Time, however, was an all important factor.

#### GENERAL SITUATION

By the time the Germans attacked, on 7 August, this plan had largely been put into effect. The XIX Corps had taken Vire. (26) In the VII Corps sector, the 9th Division had cleared the Forêt de St. Sever and had advanced to a position east of St. Pois, pinching out the 4th Division. (27) The 30th Division had closed in Mortain and occupied the high ground around it. (28) The 35th and 4th Divisions had started their attacks south of the 30th Division. (29) The 1st Division and the 3rd Armored had been relieved and were consolidating in expectation of pushing forward in a drive through Ambrières (30) to envelop the German left flank.

The 39th Infantry had been swung wide, and ordered to come into the line around Cherence le Roussel and cover the gap between the 9th Division's right flank and the 30th Division at Mortain. (31) This gap was about ten miles.

(18) A-1, p. 6; (19) A-1, p. 5; (20) A-1, p. 5; (21) A-1, p. 5;  
(22) A-1, p. 4; (23) A-1, p. 4; (24) A-2, p. 51; (25) A-1, p. 4;  
(26) A-1, p. 5; (27) A-1, p. 5; (28) A-2, p. 56; (29) A-1, Map 1;  
(30) A-1, p. 5; (31) Personal knowledge.

## THE BATTALION IN ATTACK, 4-5 AUGUST

On the night of the 4-5 August, the 1st Battalion was ordered to move to Juvigny; contact the 16th Infantry, 1st Division; learn the situation there; and seize the high ground east of Charence le Roussel. The regiment would move the next day pending road clearances to the vicinity of the high ground north of Charence le Roussel. (32) (see map B )

The battalion closed into an assembly area southwest of Juvigny around midnight, 4-5 August. (33) After a night conference and early daylight reconnaissance the situation seemed to be as follows:

The 16th Infantry was extended to the south with its headquarters southeast of Juvigny. A Task Force of the 3rd Armored Division was holding the north slope of the St. Barthelmy-Juvigny ridge and extending down to Mesnil-Tanc. The 30th Division was going into Mortain to the southeast. The 16th Infantry was to move south to rejoin its division on the 5 August. The 3rd Armored Division Task Force would support our attack initially by fire but would then move south to rejoin its organization. (34)

No information of the enemy was available concerning the sector in which we were to advance except that there were some Germans out there. However, no resistance was anticipated until the battalion emerged from the woods two-thirds of the way down the slope. (35)

The plans were made and the orders issued for an attack. The objective was the high ground to the North-Northeast. A Company was to attack on the left with the platoon of tank destroyers (1st Platoon, Company A, 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion) and a section of heavy machine guns attached.

(32) Personal knowledge; (33) Personal knowledge;  
(34) Personal knowledge; (35) Personal knowledge.

C Company was to attack on the right with the tank platoon (1st Platoon, Company A, 756th Tank Battalion) and a heavy machine gun section attached. B Company was to be in reserve and follow A Company on the left. D Company would follow B Company and the mortar platoon would be prepared to go into action upon call. Headquarters would follow D Company when the situation would permit. (36)

At 050800 August the leading companies started down the steep, wooded slope as planned. (37) Both companies reported reaching the road going east from Mesnil-~~aux~~ and were ordered to push forward to the objective. (38) A Company soon reported that the lead tank destroyer had become stuck in the narrow sunken trail and that the company was going forward without them, leaving a squad for protection. The Pioneer and Ammunition Platoon was sent to relieve this guard which rejoined its company. (39)

Reports from C Company became more and more confusing. They seemed to have veered way off their direction of attack and contact was lost. Some time was lost in tracking their route before contact was reestablished. The company commander had changed his plan of advance upon seeing the wide open draw. He had noticed the wooded slope carried most of the way if he followed the road to the east and then north. This way he could keep out of the valley and also under cover. He had done this but failed to notify the Battalion Commander of the change. By this time C Company had reached a small group of farm houses called la Hardiere. Here they met the enemy advancing westward in small numbers, perhaps a platoon or more, supported by tanks. The company deployed but made only small gains up hill. They

(36) Personal knowledge; (37) (38) Statement by Captain William E. Thomas, Heavy Weapons Company Commander; personal knowledge; (39) Personal knowledge. *when?*



had just cleared the houses when they stopped. The Germans were hastily entrenching and were believed to be about a company. This was the situation when the Battalion Commander arrived.

(40)

Meanwhile, A Company had pushed forward to the nose of the hill east of Charence le Roussel without incident. B Company had followed A Company and was just crossing the stream.

(41)

The rest of the battalion had been held up on the Mesnil-Tewe road where the tank destroyers had become stuck. The tank destroyer had been freed and all were awaiting orders.

(42)

At this time the Battalion Commander ordered A Company to occupy the west slope of the hill along the N-S trail and dig in along the north half refusing their north flank.

B Company was ordered to move to C Company's left flank and attack in conjunction with C Company. Battalion Headquarters was directed to set up about one mile east of Charence le Roussel near the trail junction with the main road. (43)

The attack started but little progress was made. (44)

As the day was fast coming to a close the Battalion Commander decided to pull his forces out and move to consolidate with the rest of the battalion for the night, and make a coordinated attack up the hill through the woods from the western nose in the morning. He ordered C Company to pull out when covered by darkness and move to positions along the southern half of the trail; tie in with A Company; and extend down to the creek. B Company was alerted to keep up the engagement; cover C Company's move; and upon order revert to positions near the Battalion Command Post in reserve. They would dig in as a secondary line of defense. (45) (See map C )

(40, 41, 42, 43, 44) Personal knowledge; (45) Personal experience.

This shift was made without interference. However, A Company had pulled around too far to the north and contact was not made with C Company that night. C Company refused its left flank; and also its right along the trail, and extended across the road almost to the creek. B Company tied in between A and C Companies. (46) (see map D )

Since no attack was expected the positions were left unchanged and all dug in for the night in expectation of an early attack in the morning. (47)

In moving the tank destroyers into a position to protect the south and east of the battalion one lost a track and boggy by mines. One destroyer had cleared the field before the explosion so it went into position near the main road on C Company's right flank. After the Pioneer Platoon had cleared the mines, the other section went into position near the main road in rear of B Company. (48)

Battalion headquarters and the mortar platoon went into positions south of the main road near the junction of the west trail. It was left here in expectation of moving forward the next day. (49)

Numerous patrols ran into C Company's positions that night. Though none were captured a number of Germans were killed.

Orders for the next day were for A and C Companies to continue the attack and seize the top of the hill. B Company was to remain in reserve. The tanks remained attached to C Company. The tank destroyers were to remain in position and were attached to B Company. The pioneer platoon was to clear the north road covered by A Company. A mortar observer from D Company was sent to both A and B Companies. Another section

(46, 47, 48, 49) Personal experience

of machine guns was sent to A Company. The forward command post was to follow C Company. (50)

### 6 AUGUST

The attack started at 0800 as planned. However, C Company was able to advance up the trail only a short way. It took one group of houses but was stopped before it could get the second. Pressure remained all along its right flank north of the road. (51)

A Company proceeded up to the trail and had gotten a squad across it, when they were ordered to stand fast. Contact with C Company had been lost and a large gap had developed. Both A and C Companies had patrol contact with B Company, however. (52)

By this time the Pioneer Platoon had swept the road almost up to A Company's left flank. Here the platoon leader observed two enemy tanks creeping down the road. They fired at the platoon but too late. The platoon leader had ordered his platoon into the cover of the woods. The tanks stopped and withdrew. (53)

It was evident by this time that the best plan of action for the battalion was to go into a defensive position in its present locations. The enemy was strong and reenforced with armor. Our flanks were badly exposed. The nearest troops were over two miles to our rear and just moving into position to attack to the north. This was the rest of the regiment. Spasmodic artillery had been falling in the vicinity but mainly at Charence le Roussel and was believed to be unobserved. The regimental commander confirmed this decision (54) and the attack was called off. A Company was ordered to tie in with B Company (50, 51, 52) Personal knowledge; (53) Personal knowledge - Statement by 1st Lt Bailey, Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon Leader; (54) Personal knowledge. *When*

and refuse its left flank. B Company was ordered to dig in for defensive reserve placing one platoon south of the road to protect Battalion Headquarters. C Company was ordered to hold what it had; to cover the road; and put an outpost south of it around the tank destroyer.

The Pioneer Platoon booby trapped the area around B Company's right flank extending around D Company's mortars. They were then ordered into the line extending around from B Company past D Company's mortar platoon just in case they were needed. (55)

Around noon the 26th Field Artillery Liaison Officer and his forward observer arrived. He informed the battalion commander that his batteries were in position northwest of Juvigny (56) and had registered. (57) This meant that artillery support could once again back up the battalion. The observer was at once sent to C Company. Defensive fires were planned as well as various concentrations and harassing fires.

While these changes were taking place a German infantry attack moved down the valley to the north toward Charence le Roussel. (58) The Germans kept close to the stream without visible means of flank security. The leading elements had passed A Company's left flank positions when they were first observed. A Company opened up with what fire they had available and notified battalion. (59) (see map E )

The reserve platoon of A Company was moved to the western nose of the hill and opened fire from positions along the sunken trail. The 81mm mortars opened up with celerity. The supply of HE light became low and the HE heavy was used. This proved very effective against personnel as well as crew-served weapons. The ground was hard and most of the shells went off on top

(55) Personal knowledge; (56) A-2, p. 57; (57, 58, 59) Personal knowledge.

of the ground. (60) The artillery let down a cloud burst of steel to the northeast of A Company, over the creek. The entire area was well covered with the four machine guns from D Company. The Germans got as far as the road but few lived to tell about it. The fire placed down was just plain murderous.

As night settled down over the hill only patrol action was noticed. This was not unusual but was the custom of the time. However, shortly before midnight an attack drove C Company's left flank back past their command post. The buildings in the area were set on fire and the area was lit up by the blaze. Men started drifting back saying that the Germans had broken through and the company was wiped out. Both wire and radio were out. The few stragglers were taken back up through B Company. The company commander had collected his men behind his center and right platoons and counterattacked. He was able to regain his former positions and knock out a number of the enemy. (61) Here, too, the tanks proved their worth in close support of infantry by merely fire power and threat.

So far the enemy had struck where the battalion was strong, and in numbers not exceeding our own. He now tried other means. His artillery, so far used only as long range <sup>tan</sup> indictory fire, was greatly increased. This still did not seem to be observed. Some did land along our right flank, however. The outpost on the south road (C Company) called in the report that a large force was seen by shadows and could be heard moving down (west) the Mesnil-~~Leve~~ road (east-west) including both infantry and mechanized vehicles. Also, that infantry were moving down in the stream. Firing broke out from B Company's right flank and

(60) Personal knowledge - statement by Capt Thomas, Heavy Weapons Company Commander; (61) Personal knowledge.

they reported an infantry attack, strength unknown but believed large. The artillery defensive fire was called down. Regiment was notified of a large armor-infantry attack. (62) Everything we had in position went into action with fire. Several booby traps and one trip flare went off between the outpost and B Company. The tanks and tank destroyers fired at moving shadows whenever the smoke cleared. The rumbling of tanks moved on down the valley. (63) The attack against B Company was short lived. The southeast flank was wide open, not even a booby trap or an outpost to give warning. For hours the tanks could be heard continually passing the battalion on their way down the valley. (64) Once more C Company's right flank was attacked by infantry. This was stopped quickly by rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire with the help of the tanks.

Finally, F Company Commander came into the command post and reported that his company had been attached to the battalion. (65) He was ordered to extend the right flank back around battalion headquarters to the road, with a mission of defending to the south and west. They were in position by daylight. The valley still echoed with bursting enemy and friendly artillery to the southeast. The German artillery going over the battalion now sounded like freight trains on wings. These must have been rockets. (66)

Since the defense first started the wire communication had been out often. However, during the last day and night, the wire contact was broken more than not. The wire crews from regiment as well as from battalion worked almost constantly to keep it repaired. Each time they came back they brought information. (67) This was discouraging as it was always bad news.

(62) Personal knowledge; (63) A-2, p. 58; (64, 65, 66, 67) Personal knowledge.

## 7 AUGUST

These reports, mostly rumors, and the rockets were all that sounded like war during the early morning. But when a look at the surrounding area was taken, it was a different story. Knocked out tanks and dead men were ghostly reminders of that sleepless night. The green valley now was a mess of grey-brown holes.

During the day the battalion was given a large backing. The 2nd Battalion, 39th Infantry moved up and protected the left flank. (68) Elements of the 4th Division moved up to Mesnil-Bove (69) and went into position across the valley. Though stuck out like a sore thumb the battalion felt secure.

A few patrols ran into C Company's east flank in the afternoon and evening but they were quickly dispensed with by small arms. (70)

The Pioneer Platoon booby trapped the area from C Company's outpost to B Company's right flank platoon. They also set out many trip flares. (71)

B Company with their .50 calibre machine gun, and one from headquarters, shooting overhead fire, sprayed the grass covered buildings in front of C Company's left flank and set them on fire. (72)

## 8 AUGUST

The night of 7-8 August was another nightmare. Everyone was very tired but the support gained by the reinforcements which had gone into position was not enough to make minds relax. Most of the men slept but few officers could because of nervousness and the alert which was maintained.

As dawn came a large flock of sheep was driven from the east through C Company's right flank. (73) This was followed

(68) Personal knowledge; (69) A-1, p. 6; (70, 71) Personal knowledge; (72) Personal knowledge; statement by Captain Thomas, Heavy Weapons Company Commander; (73) Personal knowledge.

very shortly by an attack against that position. The sheep were apparently used to clear out any mine fields, to add confusion, and give away our positions. The men were not fooled and remained quiet until the Germans had attacked. Small arms, including the tanks' machine guns, dispatched those who escaped the artillery.

During the day several patrols were sent out over the valley for information. This reconnaissance showed that ten of these tanks had been hit from the north, for which the battalion was given credit. (74) A number were noted as having been knocked out by artillery. (75) Fourteen were credited to the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion (towed) (76) which had moved into position northwest of Mesnil-~~le~~ the day before. They had also knocked out some full tracks and trucks besides. On the other hand the 1st Battalion had only light casualties. The 26th Field Artillery Battalion lost its forward switch (and other losses unknown to the author). (77) The 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion had lost eleven guns and their half-tracks and a hundred men. (78) The regiment, 39th Infantry, had <sup>suffered</sup> lost only light casualties, but <sup>lost</sup> all of the equipment of the cannon company (79), and a lot of the equipment in the antitank company and the 3d Battalion aid station. (80)

#### 9 AUGUST

Except for an alertness which was maintained throughout the night, all awoke on the 9th of August refreshed after a good night's sleep.

The morning itself was quiet except for several barrages which came into B Company's right flank, wounding a number

(74) Personal knowledge; General Orders #10, 1945, War Department;  
(75) Personal knowledge; (76) A-1, p. 5; (77) Personal knowledge;  
(78) A-1, p. 5; (79) A-2, p. 57; (80) Personal knowledge



of men and killing several. These were believed to have been enemy shells coming from the northeast and slightly north. However, a sergeant found the base fuze plug of an American 155mm shell. (81) This caused a howl of protest and after several reports to regiment we were no longer troubled from this direction.

That afternoon a number of low flying aircraft, which were taken as American C-47's, flew eastward over the battalion. They dropped a large group of supplies by parachute just in front of C Company's positions. (82) These we found out later to have been earmarked for the isolated battalion of the 30th Division near Mortain.

That evening the battalion received orders to continue the offensive in the morning. (83)

#### 10-11 AUGUST

The next day (10 August) the battalion again took up the offensive as was planned for the 6th of August. A and C Companies started up the slope and made good progress.

As this attack was progressing German rocket artillery set fire to the buildings and grass around the battalion command post and supply train. (84) The supply train was moved quickly to a position behind B Company. But one of the nets caught fire and both vehicles, overladen with mines and other ammunition, blew up. The command post moved unobstructed to A Company's former area and reestablished its wire communication.

The leading elements reached the crest of the hill early in the afternoon and spread out to secure it. (85) (see map F)

Battalion rear joined the commander that evening in the little settlement of Les Voges. (86)

(81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86) Personal knowledge.

The next day contact was made with the 28th Division, at la Foye, attacking south. (87)

#### ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

In analyzing the above action there is much to criticize. The mission of the battalion was to seize the high ground north-east of Juvigny. This they accomplished, but not in time to effectively carry out the regimental mission. However, it is doubtful if they could have done as much from the top of the hill as they did in their actual position. In the latter they could affect the operations in the Charence le Roussel-Mesnil Tove valley. (88) They actually covered the northern valley from Mont Burgon and the hill itself; while causing no little concern to the enemy in the Mesnil-Tove valley.

Information was not given to the battalion as to the known friendly lines of the 30th Division nor of the enemy's expected plan. The battalion did not rush forward to its positions but proceeded cautiously until it met the enemy at la Hardiere. Then it failed to report more than another meeting engagement, although it was obvious that it was a build up of strength.

Had C Company kept battalion informed of their change of direction, communication could have been maintained. Then once they met the enemy the entire weight of the battalion could have been brought to bear before the enemy built up their strength and the objective might have been reached.

Once the decision was made to attack from the west the positions were not checked upon and A Company did not tie in with C Company. This would have prevented the delay in taking the farms the next morning. By coordinated effort thus obtained the objective may have been taken. At least these (87) Personal knowledge; (88) A-3, A-6, A-7, A-8.

positions would have been much better for the ensuing defense. First, by affording a better contact, and second by effecting a straightened line conserving more power, leaving B Company free to protect the south and west of the battalion.

Once forced on the defensive the battalion command post was placed on the south flank unprotected, as were the mortars. There were better positions available in the center and on the west which could have better been used. As placed, the command post was left exposed on the flank toward known located enemy positions.

- No organized patrols were used to feel out the enemy's positions. Had this been done, information could have been obtained; and the conduct of the ensuing engagements would have been more favorable to the battalion.

The battalion commander was quick to size up each attack of the enemy, however, and shift his men to meet the new situation. This was much like trying to close the barn after the horse had already started to go out.

The 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion with towed guns did a good job but were left unprotected by rifle troops. This allowed the enemy infantry to overrun the position inflicting high casualties since they could not fire and move quickly. They could have abandoned their guns but their Esprit de Corps kept them firing until the last. They were very effective as shown by their string of knocked out tanks.

The shelling from the 28th Division artillery was apparently directed at our mortars. This could have been avoided if proper information of friendly locations had been passed to all firing units around the area; and by proper clearance before firing in other's zones.

The faulty dropping-of supplies destined for the isolated

battalion of the 30th Division was a result of several factors. The hills were somewhat similar. There was an apparent lack of complete orientation. There was a lack on the part of the ground units to mark not only the front lines by panels but also rear elements to identify which side of the front our troops were. And mainly by a lack of prior air reconnaissance.

However, there were commendable points to note also. The change of direction by C Company at the beginning was sound. His plan of keeping to the high ground, and under cover of the woods, instead of crossing low open ground when his lateral movement was comparatively small, is within the teaching of sound tactics.

The withdrawal of B and C Companies from la Hardiere to the defensive position was well planned and excellently executed. This is a difficult task at best.

Once in the defensive position all companies made maximum use of their weapons and manpower within their area. Men were well spaced and easily supported each other by fire. The companies so positioned their men as to form a quick reserve in case of a breakthrough such as happened to C Company.

The tank platoon took up very exact positions to give not only A-T defense to the north, east, and south, but to coordinate their machine gun fire with C Company.

The tank destroyers also went into very good positions. They had depth yet could concentrate their fire to the south and west as well as the east. The results were ten of the enemy's tanks at night without loss to our own.

The enemy forces can also be analyzed with a critical eye. Their main weakness seemed to be lack of current information and evaluation of what they did have. This was shown many times by their efforts to attack the battalion frontally, yet

never from the flank. The only exception being their wide envelopment from the north. Had they attacked with their armor down the north road they would have had better success. Again their big night drive on the seventh failed to attack us from the rear; turned south at Mesnil-Fevre into a tank destroyer battalion instead of right into a regimental rear and a better road net.

This was also true of the bigger picture as they struck where the First Army was strongest instead of further south against the weak spot.

### LESSONS

From the analysis of the foregoing action many lessons can be learned.

1. Information is necessary to the successful completion of any campaign.
2. Communication is essential to the execution of modern combat missions.
3. In the defense all around positions are necessary even at the expense of depth.
4. Patrol action is absolutely necessary in order to obtain information. This is just as important in the defense as well as in the offense.
5. A defense must be flexible in order to be successful.
6. In the defense full use must be made of each weapon, and men must be spaced far enough apart to allow this. Mutual support must be the guiding principle.
7. Emplaced guns must be given rifle protection.
8. Reorganization must be carried on whenever a lull occurs.

9. Registered artillery can effectively lay down a defensive fire barrage.

10. Booby traps and trip flares in front of the main line of resistance are very helpful as a warning system.

11. Tanks are a good morale factor.